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Re: Hash Algorithm to Authenticate Time Source Jun 5, 2009 5:49 AM
I have been locking down ESX servers for a client and one of the requirements is that we must configure all ESX Servers to use a hashing algorithm to authenticate the time source if we are using NTP. The exerp is as follows: "Since NTP is used to ensure accure log file timestamps for information, NTP could pose a security risk if a malicious user were able to falsify NTP information. Implementing authentication between NTP peers can mitigate this risk. When hashing authentication is enforced, there is a greater level of assurance that NTP updates are from a trusted source.." This is all the information I have. Any idea what enforcing authentication with NTP actually is or how it is done? I can't find any information to support this. |
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Re: Hash Algorithm to Authenticate Time Source Jun 6, 2009 12:12 PM
Hello,
Moved to ESX 3.5 forum. Best regards, Edward L. Haletky VMware Communities User Moderator, VMware vExpert 2009 Now Available on Rough-Cuts: 'VMware vSphere(TM) and Virtual Infrastructure Security: Securing ESX and the Virtual Environment' Also available 'VMWare ESX Server in the Enterprise' SearchVMware Pro|Blue Gears|Top Virtualization Security Links|Virtualization Security Round Table Podcast |
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Implement one of the methods here:
http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Support/ConfiguringAutokey Though, in all honesty, if you are worried about having your internal NTP servers spoofed, you have much larger problems. --Matt VCP, vExpert, Unix Geek |
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This is the first time I ever heard that someone wanted to do a hash check on his ntp source.
Duncan VMware Communities User Moderator | VCP | VCDX Blogging: http://www.yellow-bricks.com Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/depping If you find this information useful, please award points for "correct" or "helpful". |
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Indeed - this idea of running your own clock source on a safe network is probably te best choice.. GPS linked time sources are pretty cheap.
--Matt VCP, vExpert, Unix Geek |