Hello,
If you want your VMs to see your iSCSI network then they also must participate in this. I however recommend that the VM access and the Host access be segregated some how. If you only have your VMs access the iSCSI server and you have no other remote storage then vMotion will not work. Consider this:
VM only access to iSCSI using iSCSI initiator.... Where does the boot disk live? On local storage.... So therefore no vMotion.
VM and Host access to iSCSI using initiator within VMs and iscsi target within Host.... Could a VM then see any of the VMFS' on the remote storage? This depends on how the LUNs are presented, how the iSCSI server segregates such traffic. Does your iSCSI server support multiple network links? If so you may want to use a set of links for hosts and a set of links for initiators. If the Host uses iSCSI then an SC connection must be part of this network. How would such access impact disk performance at the Host level. Or impact the VM networks. With only 10 pNICs and 2 assigned to a DMZ, you could do this but you compromise security or redundancy on other networks. See previous discussions. If you have another set of pNICs then this would be a safe option. iSCSI is all about performance moving through the network to have VMs using iSCSI initiators they would need the network bandwidth for disk access. You can get the same backup/restoration behavior using Raw Disk Maps as well, which can use the Host based iSCSI target code. Either method works.
SC and vMotion in a truly secure environment should never be over the same vSwitch or pNICs. Yes people do it, but it really is insecure. However, this is mostly a trust related issue. If your administrators are allowed to login to the VMs then it is a moot issue as they have the credentials however if they are not allowed to login then allowing them access to the vMotion network could allow someone to gain those credentials quite easily just by capturing the data during a vMotion. Or if your SC is hacked and you are using remote login services a hacker can do the exact same thing. For full protection make it a private link.
4. If your staff attended the "Deploy, Secure and Analyse" training session, tell them to look at pages Module1 - Lesson 3 and Module2 - page 12. In my environment, all service console and Vmotion traffic will be on a secured VLAN that is only accessible from my laptop, an ESX host server, or the VirtualCenter server. This will remove all concerns about having SC and Vmotion on the same network.
Absolutely, lock down which machines have access to the Service Console, but nothing but an ESX server should have access to vMotion. If this laptop or any other host was compromised it can be setup to grab the memory image as it travels across the network during a vMotion and thereby gather credential data. I would not risk this.
Best regards,
Edward L. Haletky
VMware Communities User Moderator
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Author of the book 'VMWare ESX Server in the Enterprise: Planning and Securing Virtualization Servers', Copyright 2008 Pearson Education. As well as the Virtualization Wiki at
http://www.astroarch.com/wiki/index.php/Virtualization