I'll take a shot at trying to offer an acceptable answer : )
It comes down to a level of paranoia/comfort. You're concerned about collapsing various levels of security over a single FCoE link, however there seems to be a lack of concern about segementing these disparate networks by means of separate network cards? - If you ask me, the risk of having your server compromised is far more likely than having your switch comprosmied. FCoE is targetting the hypervisor host as well and HPC. If your traffic is that high security level then it should even be handled by a ESX server sharing lower security networks. In this case your should have a dedicated ESX host on the other side of your firewall.
I've pointed out the direction this technology is going and a couple points that address it.
1. Cisco's implementation of Datacenter Ethernet/FCoE will make use of TrustSec. This will secure traffic between your host & switch from MITM attacks. As I said before, if you're concerned about collapsing varying security level networks onto a single wire, you should examine if they should even reside on the server.
2. To properly secure ESX we've introduced the Nexus 1000v. A full security feature layer 2 switch. Though its a software switch you can still isolate/separate your higher-level security zones to dedicated uplink adapters if you choose.
FCoE is not the end-all & be-all and it might not suite all topologies or network requirements. However, for the majority of infrastructures its going to offer huge advantages. My hope is that rather than fear this technology continue to examine & scrutinize it, so enhancements and suggestions to make it more appealing to implement & use.
Burnsie